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 Breaking Into the
 Intergovernmental Matrix:
 The Lumbee Tribe's Efforts to Secure
 Federal Acknowledgment
 David E. Wilkins
 University ofArizona
 This article discusses the concept ofpolitical recognition (both federal and state) ofIndian tribes;
 explains the difference between administrative and legislative recognition; examines who is or should
 be empowered to extend federal recognition, the Congress or the executive branch; discusses the major
 factors that have compelled the Lumbees to seek federal recognition when they were already
 acknowledged by the state; and examines the major factors that have precluded them from securing
 complete federal recognition.
 This article examines the efforts of the Lumbee Nation,' a majority of Robeson
 County's2 indigenous population, to establish a government-to-government rela-
 tionship with the United States via the federal recognition process. We address this
 by attempting to answer two broad questions: (1) why do the Lumbees want federal
 recognition when they already have a measure of state recognition and (2) what
 major factors have precluded federal acknowledgment after more than 100 years of
 concerted, though punctuated, political effort?
 While a vast literature exists on federal-state-local relations, comparatively little
 has been generated on the tribal role in the intergovernmental matrix.3 This is a
 fascinating and troublesome oversight when we ponder the unique political status
 ' While a voluminous literature exists on Lumbees in general, the two standard historical/anthropological
 works are Adolph Dial and David Eliades, The OnlyLandlKnow (San Francisco: Indian Historian Press,
 1975) and Karen I. Blu, The Lumbee Problem: The Making ofan American Indian People (New York:
 Cambridge University Press, 1980). See also Jack Campisi, The Lumbee Petition (Pembroke, N.C.:
 Lumber River Legal Services, 1987); Adolph Dial, The Lumbees: Southeast (New York: Chelsea
 House, 1992), and Gerald M. Sider, Lumbee Indian Histories: Race, Ethnicity and Indian Identity in
 the Southern United States (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 2Robeson County, located in southeastern North Carolina, is the second largest county in the state.
 It is uniquely tri-racial. Of the total population of slightly more than 100,000, blacks = 26.2 percent,
 whites = 42.8 percent, and Indians = 30.5 percent.
 'But see Deil S. Wright, Understanding Intergovernmental Relations (3rd ed.; Pacific Grove, Cal.:
 Brooks/Cole, 1988) who in this edition introduced a section on Indian affairs.
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 of recognized tribes in the United States. Politically and legally, their uniqueness
 stems from their being the original sovereigns of this portion of the western
 hemisphere. In addition, the U.S. Constitution, explicitly in the commerce clause
 and by application of the treaty clause (tribes negotiated over 400 treaties with the
 United States), acknowledged the separate and autonomous nature of tribal nations.
 The de facto existence oftribal nations, along with the constitutional affirmation
 of their autonomy, has normally meant that exclusive (or plenary) authority has
 been vested in the Congress to regulate federal affairs with Indian tribes. This article
 focuses principally on Lumbee-federal interaction, which has major implications
 for Lumbee-state relations because ofthe doctrine of congressional plenary power.
 This is more interesting, however, when some tribes, like the Lumbee, secure a
 degree of political acknowledgment from a state before pursuing political relations
 with the federal government.
 WHY FOCUS ON THE LUMBEE?
 For the duration of this study, we will focus on the Lumbee tribe, although there are
 other indigenous groups in the county which insist that they are also distinctive
 political-cultural tribal polities. This tribal differentiation-the separation of
 Robeson County's indigenous population into several politically, if not culturally,
 disparate groups-and the ramifications of this segmentation for internal tribal
 dynamics and intergovernmental relations is a powerful dynamic affecting the
 Lumbees' quest for federal acknowledgment. This is arguably the most persistent
 conundrum confronting the county's indigenous population, especially as it per-
 tains to the tribe's efforts to project a common tribal identity that might facilitate
 federal recognition.
 The indigenous population of Robeson County is segmented into seven tribal
 organizations.4 Each group is pursuing an independent path toward federal
 recognition. This is not the forum to detail the controversial developments leading
 to this recent proliferation of differentiated groups in Robeson County.5 This
 splintering and the lack of consensus among the various competing political, yet
 biologically related, groups have made it more difficult for the Lumbees to secure
 federal acknowledgment and for the other groups to gain state or federal recogni-
 tion.
 This has been most evident since the latest administrative and legislative
 recognition push began in the late 1980s. Before then, the Lumbee tribe generally
 understood itself internally and presented itself externally as a relatively cohesive
 4These are: Lumbee Tribe of Cheraw Indians, Hatteras Tuscarora Tribe, Cherokees of Robeson and
 Adjoining Counties, Tuscarora Indian Tribe of Drowning Creek Reservation, Tuscarora Tribe of North
 Carolina, Eastern Carolina Tuscarora Indian Organization, and Tuscarora Nation of North Carolina.
 'The first organization to be formed was the Eastern Carolina Tuscarora Indian Organization in 1970.
 This group was seemingly dissatisfied with the name Lumbee and wanted to establish connections to a
 more traditional name. Internal conflicts, however, soon led to the splintering of this group into several
 factions. See Ruth Y. Wetmore, First on the Land: The North Carolina Indian (Winston Salem, N.C.:
 John F. Blair, 1975), pp. 168-169.
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 people. However, since the formation of the first splinter group, the Eastern
 Carolina Tuscarora Organization in 1970, this general group cohesion has been
 shattered. Thus, when the early versions of the Lumbee recognition bill were
 introduced in Congress during the 1980s, the measures were vigorously opposed
 by the non-Lumbee indigenous groups. The general fear of these fragments was
 that they would be subsumed under the Lumbee tribe and would not be allowed to
 petition the federal government separately for recognition.6
 This indigenous segmentation also creates uncertainty and confusion among
 outsiders about Lumbee identity. For instance, the federally recognized Eastern
 Band of Cherokee has been a stalwart opponent of Lumbee recognition for many
 years. In part, their resistance results from the fact that the members of one of the
 splinter groups in Robeson County consider themselves to be Cherokees. The
 Eastern Band of Cherokee, however, refuses to believe that this group is Cherokee.
 Jonathan Taylor, their former chief, stated as much in testimony against the Lumbee
 bill in 1988: "[t]here are only two Cherokee Tribes; one ofthem is in North Carolina
 [the Eastern Band] and the other one is in Oklahoma."7
 Notwithstanding the importance of tribal segmentation, we concentrate on the
 Lumbee for several reasons. First, the Lumbee tribe dwarfs the other factions/tribes
 in population size. The Lumbees are by far the largest nonrecognized Indian tribe
 in the country, outnumbering the second largest petitioning tribe threefold. There
 are an estimated 39,000 enrolled Lumbees; the combined population of the other
 six Robeson County groups amounts to about 1,750 people.
 Second, it is widely acknowledged that the Lumbees have been studied by
 various government officials and by the academic community "more often and in
 more depth than any tribe not presently acknowledged by the Department of the
 Interior."' Third, the Lumbees are one of a handful of tribal groups that was
 informed by the associate solicitor of Indian affairs ofthe Department ofthe Interior
 that they were precluded from using the administrative process for recognition
 established by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in 1978.
 Third, a focus on the Lumbees is warranted because their original (1956)
 acknowledgment legislation arose in an era, "the termination years,"' when the
 federal government legislatively and unilaterally severed its political relationship
 with a number of tribes, bands, and rancherias (small Indian reservations in
 California). The termination years have been replaced by "the tribal self-determi-
 nation" era (1970 to present), and a majority of the tribes and Indian groups
 terminated in the 1950s and 1960s have been restored to federal status. The Lumbee
 tribe remains, politically speaking, frozen in time-connected to an aberrant policy
 period that has been forcefully repudiated by the Congress and the executive
 branch.
 6See Congressman Charlie Rose's (D-NC) comments in the CongressionalRecord, 103rd Cong., I st
 sess., 1993, Vol. 139, p. 344.
 7U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672: Federal
 Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe ofNorth Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 36.
 8U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Testimony ofArlindaLocklear, Lumbee
 StaffAttorney, on S. 1036 andH.R. 1426, 102nd Cong., Ist sess., 1991.
 967 Stat. B132 (1953). This policy era lasted from 1953 into the 1960s.
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 WHAT IS POLITICAL RECOGNITION?
 Federal recognition has historically had two distinctive meanings. Before the
 1870s, "recognize" or "recognition" was used in the cognitive sense. In other
 words, federal officials simply acknowledged that a tribe existed.'0 During the
 1870s, however, "recognition," or more accurately, "acknowledgment," began to
 be used in a formal jurisdictional sense. It is this later usage that is most often used
 today by the federal government to describe its relationship to tribes. In short, it is
 a formal act that establishes a political relationship between a tribe and the United
 States. Federal acknowledgment affirms a tribe's sovereign status. Simulta-
 neously, it outlines the federal government's responsibilities to the tribe.
 More specifically, federal acknowledgment means that a tribe is not only entitled
 to the immunities and privileges available to other tribes, but is also subject to the
 same federal powers, limitations, and other obligations of recognized tribes. What
 this means, particularly the "limitations" term, is that "acknowledgement shall
 subject the Indian tribe to the same authority of Congress and the United States to
 which other federally acknowledged tribes are subjected."" In short, tribes are
 informed that they are now subject to federal plenary power and may, ironically,
 benefit from the virtually unlimited and still largely unreviewable authority of the
 federal government. For example, they have exemptions from state tax laws, enjoy
 sovereign immunity, and are not subject to the same constitutional constraints as are
 the federal and state governments.
 As Vine Deloria has observed, "a substantial number of presently-recognized
 Federal Indian tribes have been recognized in this century, the majority of whom
 have been recognized through Congressional act."'2 While the present administra-
 tive process of federal recognition of tribes was established under general authority
 delegated by the Congress to the Interior Department, "there is no specific statutory
 authority for the process. Hence, the substantive criteria applied in the present
 administrative process and the procedures used by the Department in processing
 petitions are wholly administrative in origin."'3
 While this is also the view expressed by the U.S. Senate Committee on Indian
 Affairs, it is by no means the unanimous legislative perspective. The Ronald
 Reagan and George Bush administrations and key congressional members argued
 that the administrative process developed in 1978 was the more appropriate path for
 tribes to follow in pursuit of federal acknowledgment. As Representative Jay
 Rhodes (R-AZ) noted, "Which forum is the more appropriate [one] for determining
 Federal recognition? Is it with Congress or is it with the Secretary of the Interior?"
 Rhodes said, "I firmly believe that the recognition process established within the
 Department of the Interior is the more appropriate forum."14
 '0See William Quinn, Jr., "Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes? The Historical
 Development ofa Legal Concept," The American Journal ofLegalHistory 34 (October 1990): 331-363.
 "56 Federal Register 47,325 (1991).
 '2U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Testimony ofDeloria on S. 2672, 100th
 Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 24.
 13S. Rept. 102-251, 26 November 1991, p. 10.
 '4Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., Ist sess., 1991, Vol. 137, p. H6890.
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 Deloria, however, raised a counterargument in 1988 on why the Congress, not
 the administration, should be the body to extend federal recognition. In rebutting
 then Assistant Secretary Ross Swimmer's testimony that it was unfair for the
 Lumbees to petition the Congress directly, thereby avoiding BIA's process without
 according that same right to all other petitioning tribes, Deloria stated that it was
 unfair to ask tribes to go directly to BIA for acknowledgment because "the BIA must
 stand in an adversarial role to that [the petitioning] Indian community and force the
 Indian community to prove itself to the Bureau. The Bureau then would certify it
 as an Indian tribe and turn around and ask it to be in a trust relationship with it."'"
 The debate over administrative versus legislative recognition rages on, with
 some advocates from each camp asserting their exclusive right to extend or
 withhold recognition. This raises an important point: Is there a qualitative
 difference between the two types of recognition? There are two important
 differences. First, tribes that opt for the administrative variety must meet a
 formalized set of eligibility criteria.'6 Tribes that pursue congressional legislation,
 provided they can muster enough proof that they are a legitimate group composed
 of people of Indian ancestry, have to make a compelling case to the congressional
 representative(s) of the state they reside in. The congressional sponsor(s) then
 makes the case for the tribe via legislation.
 The second major difference involves the administrative law component known
 as "subordinate delegation."'7 The major grant of authority the Congress has
 delegated to the secretary of the interior is located in Title 25--Indians--of the
 United States Code. Section 1 states that the head of Indian affairs, formerly the
 commissioner of Indian affairs, today the assistant secretary of Indian affairs, is
 "appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate."'1
 In section 2, the head is authorized to "have the management of all Indian affairs
 and of all matters arising out of Indian relations."19 As William Quinn states, this
 law "would arguably not authorize the Secretary or Commissioner to establish a
 perpetual government-to-government relationship via federal acknowledgment
 with an Indian group not already under the Department's aegis."20 Nevertheless,
 Quinn asserts that the secretary of the interior, with the U.S. Supreme Court's
 approval, has historically exercised the authority to "recognize" tribes "when a
 vacuum of responsibility existed over decades, resulting in a gradual and
 unchallenged accretion of this authority."21
 The problem, however, is not that the secretary is usurping unused congressional
 authority; instead, it is the manner and degree to which secretarial discretion and
 "U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672: Federal
 Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe ofNorth Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 25.
 '6See below, which details the seven major criteria.
 '7See William W. Quinn, Jr., "Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes: Authority,
 Judicial Interposition, and 25 C.F.R. ? 83," American Indian Law Review 17 (Fall 1992): 37-61.
 1825 U.S.C. Chapter 1, Section 1, p. 961.
 "Ibid., p. 962.
 20Quinn, "Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes," 48.
 2'Ibid., 52.
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 interpretation of federal laws have been discharged by BIA officials. As Felix
 Cohen said forty years ago, "Indians for some decades have had neither armies nor
 lawyers to oppose increasingly broad interpretations of the power of the Commis-
 sioner of Indian Affairs, and so little by little 'the management of all Indian affairs'
 has come to be read as 'the management of all the affairs of Indians'."22 This
 statement has relevance today, notwithstanding the federal government's policy of
 Indian self-determination and the more recent experimental policy of tribal self-
 governance, which allows certain tribes to set their own budgets, run their own
 programs, and negotiate directly with the federal government for certain services.23
 The Congress' track record is problematic as well. Generally speaking, however,
 tribes with explicit congressional acknowledgment have found their status less
 subject to the whims of BIA officials, though even that is no guarantee of smooth
 affairs because BIA oversees and administers most of the federal government's
 political relationship with tribes.24 The Congress has, moreover, in recent years
 tried to reassert its constitutional authority in the field by introducing legislation that
 would have transferred administrative and congressional consideration of applica-
 tions for federal recognition to an independent commission.25
 TRIBAL RECOGNITION/TRIBAL TERMINATION
 Given that the Lumbee tribe has been in active pursuit of either federal acknowledg-
 ment or federal aid for over 100 years, two major questions require explanation: (1)
 why have the Lumbees sought federal acknowledgment when they already have a
 measure of state acknowledgment, and (2) why have they not received complete
 recognition to date?
 22Felix Cohen, "The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-1953: A Case Study in Bureaucracy," Yale Law
 Journal 62 (February 1953): 352.
 23See, e.g., Robert A. Nelson and Joseph F. Sheley, "Current B.I.A. Influence on Indian Self-
 Determination," Social Science Journal 19 (July 1982): 73-85 and the statement of Joe De La Cruz,
 chairman of the Quinault Tribal Business Committee, who said that despite legislation, BIA had not
 cooperated with the tribes in the self-governance experiment (U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee
 on Indian Affairs, Hearings on Initiative for the 1990s, 10 1st Cong., 2nd sess., 1990, p. 17).
 24A prime example involves the Pascua Yaqui tribe ofsouthern Arizona. The Yaqui were legislatively
 recognized in 1978 (92 Stat. 712). However, in the late 1980s, when they solicited the approval of BIA
 on some changes in their tribal constitution, they were informed by BIA that they were limited in what
 governmental powers they could exercise because they were not a "historic tribe," but were instead
 merely a "created adult Indian community."
 A historic tribe has existed since time immemorial. Its powers derive from its unextinguished,
 inherent sovereignty. Such a tribe has the full range of governmental powers except where it has
 been removed by Federal law in favor of either the United States or the state in which the tribe
 is located. By contrast, a community of adult Indians is composed simply of Indian people who
 reside together on trust land. A community of adult Indians may have a certain status which
 entitles it to certain privileges and immunities.... However, that status is derived as a necessary
 scheme to benefit Indians, not from some historical inherent sovereignty (Letter from Carol A.
 Bacon, acting director of the Office of Tribal Services, BIA, 3 December 1991).
 The Bureau's attempt to distinguish the Yaqui from other tribes is a novel and disturbing approach
 to determining tribal identity.
 25See U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1315: Indian
 Federal Recognition Administrative Procedures Act of 1991, 102nd Cong., Ist sess., 1991. This
 legislation died when the Congress adjourned in 1991.
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 Before addressing the first question, however, we need to consider a larger
 question: to which tribes does the United States have a legitimate responsibility-
 all Indian groups or only those tribes that can show prior political involvement with
 the federal government? When we examine the historical and legal records, as well
 as federal policy enunciations, it is evident that the federal government is legally
 and morally obligated to provide both recognition and financial and technical
 support for all tribes.
 Senator Daniel Inouye (D-HI) brought this out in his cosponsored bill introduced
 in 198926 which would have amended BIA's acknowledgment procedures by (1)
 establishing a statutory basis for administrative recognition, (2) establishing an
 independent Office of Federal Acknowledgment that would be "free from political
 pressure," and (3) authorizing federal grants for which petitioning tribes could
 compete in order to help them conduct the research necessary to substantiate their
 petitions. Section 2 of S. 611 stated that: "The first Congress, by enacting the Act
 of July 22, 1790 (1 St. 137), recognized a special government-to-government
 relationship with all of the Indian tribes of the United States, whether or not the
 Indian tribes subsequently entered into special treaty relations with the United
 States." Moreover, the Snyder Act of 1921 gave the secretary ofthe interior general
 authority to expand appropriated federal dollars "for the benefit, care, and assis-
 tance of the Indians throughout the United States."
 If this federal trust27 obligation was absent, the Congress would have ceased
 enacting recognition legislation, and BIA would not have been compelled by the
 federal courts to establish procedures and criteria by which to establish political
 relations with previously nonrecognized tribes. The Congress has, of course,
 empowered itself with the authority to abrogate treaties,28 confiscate tribal lands
 without providing just compensation,29 impose federal criminal jurisdiction on
 Indian Country without constitutional authorization,"3 and unilaterally terminate
 the legal status of Indian tribes." However, in the area of acknowledgment, the
 26U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 611: Federal
 Acknowledgement Administrative Procedures Act of 1989, 101st Cong., I1st sess., 1989, Pts. 1 and 2.
 27The federal government's relationship to tribes is delineated either (1) in ratified treaties and
 agreements with individual tribes; (2) by the international law doctrine of trusteeship, first articulated
 in papal bulls and related documents during the time of European encounters with the non-Western
 worlds when the European nations assumed a protective role over tribes and their territories; or (3) in
 specific acts applicable to all Indians. See Vine Deloria, Jr., A BriefHistory ofthe Federal Responsibility
 to the American Indian (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1979).
 Moreover, there are two conflicting legal interpretations ofthe "trust" relationship. One view holds that
 when Indians were enfranchised, they effectively lost their rights to special federal services they had
 received under treaties, agreements, or statutes. The other view asserts that Indians retained their tribal
 treaty and special statutory rights even after being enfranchised by federal and state laws. They had, in
 effect, dual, later triple, citizenship (tribal, federal, and state).
 Tribes qua tribes are not citizens, and these sovereignties remain extraconstitutional polities not
 generally subject to the U.S. Constitution's constraints or eligible for its protections. Thus, the U.S. Bill
 of Rights is inapplicable to the acts of tribal governments, although certain portions of the first ten
 amendments were applied to tribal governments by the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (82 Stat. 77).
 28Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
 29Tee-Hit-Ton v. United States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
 3oUnited States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
 "The Termination Policy, 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
This content downloaded from 141.166.176.168 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 18:02:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 130 Publius/Fall 1993
 Congress has, over time, applied an ad hoc policy of extending federal recognition
 to petitioning tribes.
 LUMBEE-NORTH CAROLINA RELATIONS
 Various reasons have been given by the Lumbees for their desire to secure federal
 acknowledgment in addition to maintaining and expanding their state recognition.
 We will discuss these shortly. Before addressing these, we need to examine more
 closely the Lumbees' relationship to the State of North Carolina.
 The general subject oftribal-state relations has received little scholarly attention,
 even in the western states, where a majority of tribes and reservations are located.
 In the West, such issues as water rights, Indian gaming, civil jurisdiction, taxation,
 social services administration, and natural resources often dominate the political
 relations between tribes and states.32
 The situation in the eastern states, particularly the thirteen original states, is more
 confused. Under the Articles of Confederation, Article Nine gave the Congress the
 exclusive right to regulate trade with tribes, while also providing that the "legisla-
 tive right of any state within its own limits be not infringed or violated." Hence, in
 practice, it was unclear which polity-the states or the federal government-had
 authority in the field of Indian affairs.33 The only certainty was that the federal
 government had jurisdiction over western Indian affairs. However, jurisdiction was
 problematic in the thirteen original states, which had "internalized" relations with
 particular tribes. "In such cases those states continued programs already established
 during the colonial period."34 This did not apply to the Lumbee for several reasons.
 First, the Lumbees were a relatively small and powerless tribe during the
 formative years when the state government was becoming established. Second,
 they settled in an area of North Carolina that enabled them to avoid prolonged
 contact with the colonial, later state, government. Third, they were largely ignored
 by the federal government because they posed no military threat to the United
 States' expansion, did not inhabit lands deemed desirable by an overwhelming
 number of settlers, and were perceived to have been a largely incorporated tribe in
 relation to the state's political and economic infrastructure.3
 Collectively, the Lumbee tribe had few formal relations with the state before the
 1880s. This era of nonpolitical relations began to change after the Civil War when
 the state legislature enacted a law that provided for separate white and Negro
 schools. The Lumbees then sought political redress from the state because they
 were denied admittance to white schools and refused to send their children to Negro
 schools.36 Gradually, the county's Democratic leadership became aware of the
 "2See, e.g., Frank Pommersheim, "Tribal-State Relations: Hope for the Future," South Dakota Law
 Review 36 (Summer 1991): 239-276 and B. Kevin Gover, Catherine Baker Stetson, Susan M. Williams,
 Jana L. Walker, Jane Marx, Connie L. Hart, and Cindi Pearlman, "Tribal-State Dispute Resolution:
 Recent Attempts," South Dakota Law Review 36 (Summer 1991): 277-298.
 33S Lyman Tyler, A History oflndian Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
 1973), pp. 33-34.
 34Ibid., p. 32.
 35See Adolph Dial, "From Adversity to Progress," Southern Exposure 13 (November 1985): 86.
 36Jack Campisi, The Lumbee Petition (Pembroke, N.C.: Lumber River Legal Services, 1987), p. 30.
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 tribe's growing voting potential. The state's response was enactment of a law in
 1885 which acknowledged the Lumbee as The Croatan Indians of Robeson
 County" but did not create a framework for a political relationship. What this law
 did was to establish a separate school system for tribal members. The Lumbees
 (Croatans) were able to parlay their growing political clout into additional state
 legislation that established the Croatan Normal School, which was under exclusive
 Indian control. The Croatan, in effect, were enjoying rights of educational control
 that were completely denied to western, federally recognized tribes. This is
 evidenced in a 1921 law, which stated:
 [I]n order to protect the public schools in Robeson County for the education of the
 Indian race only, there shall be a committee composed of Indians who are residents
 ... and that all questions affecting the race of those applying for admission into the
 public schools of Robeson County for the Indian race only shall be referred to the
 committee ... who shall have original, exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine
 all questions ... about the race of applicants.38
 Officially, the Indians of Robeson County were still known as the "Cherokee
 Indians of Robeson County," and they remained "entitled to all the rights and
 privileges heretofore or hereafter conferred by any law or laws of the State of North
 Carolina upon the Indians.""39 This meant that they were entitled to continued state
 appropriations for their schools and also to separate accommodations at the State
 Hospital for the Insane, the local jails, and the Home for the Aged and Infirm of the
 county.40
 In the early 1950s, a campaign was begun by several prominent local Indians to
 have the tribe's name changed again. The Reverend Doctor F. Lowry, the leader
 of this movement, argued that because the tribe was comprised of members from
 various tribes, no single historical tribal name was appropriate. He suggested that
 the tribe adopt a more geographic name.41 The name chosen was Lumbee, which
 was derived from the Lumber River that flows through the county.
 In 1953, the state enacted a law designating them as the "Lumbee Indians of
 North Carolina."42 The Lumbees were informed that they would "continue to enjoy
 all rights, privileges, and immunities enjoyed by them as citizens ofthe State as now
 provided by law, and shall continue to be subject to all the obligations and duties
 of citizens under the law."43 This law is often interpreted as an extension of
 "recognition," but a credible case can be made that the state still had not explicitly
 defined the services to which the tribe was entitled, the immunities to which
 recognition entitled the recognized tribe, and the aspects of self-government the
 state was willing to acknowledge.44
 "7N.C. Public Laws, 1885, Chapter 51, pp. 92-94.
 38N.C. Public Laws, 1921, Chapter 426, pp. 574-575.
 "9N.C. Public Laws, 1913, Chapter 123, pp. 215-216.
 40N.C. Public Laws, 1911, Chapter 215, pp. 354-355.
 41Campisi, The Lumbee Petition, p. 93.
 42N.C. Public Laws, 1953, Chapter 874, p. 747.
 43Ibid.
 44See Arlinda Locklear, "Recognition," Public Policy and Native Americans in North Carolina:
 Issues for the '80s, ed. Susan M. Presti (Raleigh: North Carolina Center for Public Policy Research,
 1981), p. 56.
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 REASONS FOR SEEKING FEDERAL RECOGNITION
 The Lumbees followed upon this state action two years later by having a bill
 introduced in the Congress on their behalf by Representative Frank Carlyle (D-
 NC), which would have extended federal recognition to the tribe's members. We
 will discuss this further below. Let us return to the major reasons the tribe has sought
 federal recognition. These reasons can be grouped in three major categories: (1)
 political/legal; (2) fiscal; and (3) normative.
 Political/Legal
 Federal acknowledgment would recognize in the Lumbee tribe a measure of
 sovereignty over their own territory and their own people, something state acknowl-
 edgment cannot address because of federal supremacy in the field of Indian affairs.
 The tribe would be able to establish and maintain a separate government capable of
 exercising jurisdictional authority over tribal members and possibly nonmembers.
 In addition to powers of self-governance, the tribe would have certain protections
 from state and local government intrusion on their lands and government powers.
 Fiscal
 From this perspective, federal acknowledgment entitles the group to certain
 services from the federal government, such as medical and dental care, education
 funds and support, housing eligibility for certain loans, and legal aid. However, as
 the bills are currently phrased, addressing the Lumbees' fiscal needs would entail
 a process different from that experienced by most other acknowledged tribes. While
 the Lumbee recognition bill, as currently worded, would make tribal members
 eligible for federal services (e.g., health, education, and social services), it provides
 that such services would be unavailable to tribal members until the Congress
 specifically appropriates the funds; but even then, those appropriations would be
 considered separate from the outlays set aside for other federally recognized tribes.
 This was, from a political standpoint, deemed a compromise and necessary measure
 inserted in the 1989 legislation by the original sponsor, Representative Charlie Rose
 (D-NC). It was also endorsed by Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Ross
 Swimmer. Rose forwarded the amendment, and the Lumbee leadership accepted
 it because they believed it would appease some other recognized tribal officials and
 possibly tribal factions within Robeson County, who objected to Lumbee acknowl-
 edgment. The opponents felt that acknowledgment might entail a drastic reduction
 in their own federal entitlements because of the comparatively large size of the
 Lumbee tribal population.
 The Lumbees would actually be beneficiaries of one of the most important
 developments that arose from the tribal self-governance demonstration project.45
 45Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act Amendments of 1988, 102 Stat. 2285,
 2296 (1988); as amended, 105 Stat. 1278 (1991). The Tribal Self-Governance Demonstration Project
 is actually a new title, Title III, that was added to the 1975 legislation. This title, as originally enacted,
 allowed twenty selected tribes to design programs, activities, and services to address tribal priorities and
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 This involves the member tribes receiving their share of federal funds directly from
 the Congress after having negotiated an annual written funding agreement with
 BIA. Theoretically, this should increase the amount of real dollars that reaches the
 Indian community because by circumventing BIA, fewer dollars are lost to
 administrative costs.
 James Blum of the Congressional Budget Office predicted that "providing
 services to the tribe [Lumbee] and its members as a result of federal recognition
 could cost the federal government $120 million annually."46 Blum further noted
 that:
 [T]he cost to the federal government to provide services to the Lumbee Tribe would
 be less than the national average [approximately $3,000 per Indian annually] ... [since
 they are] recognized by the state of North Carolina. As state-recognized Indians,
 members of the Lumbee Tribe are already eligible for and receive some federal
 services and benefits including job training and education funding.47
 More pertinent, Blum acknowledged that the precise amount of new cost to the
 United States resulting from enactment of the Lumbee bill would be impossible to
 determine "because the nature of services and programs provided would be
 negotiated by the tribe and the Secretary of Interior and would be based on the
 specific needs of the tribe."48 The Lumbee bill, in short, was written to lower the
 total cost to the federal government by directly funding the tribe and by delaying
 the delivery of BIA and Indian Health Services (IHS) to the group, pending
 congressional appropriation of funds to pay for the services once the tribe's needs
 had been determined.
 There is a powerful paradox generated by these fiscal arrangements. On one
 hand, since before the turn of the century, tribes have struggled under federal
 bureaucratic constraints that have rarely allowed tribal governments any genuine
 decisionmaking authority regarding their lands, natural resources, or administra-
 tion ofjustice. On the other hand, by becoming an "acknowledged" tribe, Indian
 communities, in certain fundamental respects, subject themselves to a considerable
 amount of federal control over their lives, property, and rights. As Francis P. Prucha
 observed: "If the federal government retains responsibility ... for Indian programs,
 it must maintain some control over them. But federal control negates full tribal self-
 determination."49
 respond to local concerns. Previously, when tribal programs have been managed by the Bureau of Indian
 Affairs or even under the Indian Self-Determination grants or contracts, most of the decisionmaking and
 funding priorities were made by the federal bureaucracy. The Self-Governance project allows tribes to
 be the primary policymaker for the programs and services on their reservations, including the allocation
 of fiscal resources.
 46S. Rept. 102-251, 26 November 1991, p. 13.
 47Ibid.
 48Ibid.
 49Francis P. Prucha, TheIndian in American Society (Berkeley: University ofCalifornia Press, 1988),
 p. 90.
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 The 1988 Lumbee recognition bill, the first major legislation push since 1975,50
 in effect, was stymied by the vigorous objections raised by Assistant Secretary
 Swimmer that the Lumbees not be allowed to circumvent the administrative
 process, as well as by the passage of time. Although hearings were held in both
 chambers, no further action occurred on the House bill, while the Senate measure
 was approved by a voice vote of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs, with an
 amendment, and was reported on 30 September 1988. The amendment, previously
 discussed, authorized the Lumbees to administer federal Indian programs under an
 annual written funding agreement drawn up between the tribe and the Department
 of the Interior, instead of the tribe having to contact directly with BIA under the
 Indian Self-Determination Act of 1975.
 Normative
 While the legal and fiscal reasons are certainly important, the normative
 arguments are the most compelling ones inspiring the Lumbees' pursuit ofacknowl-
 edgment. In a 1980 report, Robert K. Thomas, a Cherokee anthropologist,
 identified what he perceived as the essence of the Lumbees' struggle for political
 recognition. After stating that health and education benefits were certainly a sincere
 motivation for Lumbees, Thomas pointed out that "there is a search for validation
 going on among Lumbees now. Many would like some official agency to not only
 validate them as Indians but to validate them as descendants of a historic Indian
 group." He went on to say that federal recognition was also a "moral point" for
 Lumbees.
 Many Indians in Robeson County feel as if the federal government has neglected them
 for too many years. Official recognition on the part ofthe federal government that they
 are indeed Indian would be something of an apology and a confession on the part of
 the federal government that officialdom has been lax in recognizing not only that the
 Lumbees are Indian but a respectable and worthy community in the world."5
 It is this conjunction of morality and validation, or legitimation, that lies at the
 heart of the Lumbees' desire for federal recognition.
 The question of specific "tribal" identity is openly debated today. This is, as
 Thomas showed, a result oftwo major factors: (1) the Lumbees have generally been
 misinformed and misled by well intentioned outsiders who, for a variety of reasons,
 tried to persuade the Lumbees that they belonged to this or that Indian group, or were
 not really Indian at all, but tri-racial communities; or (2) they want "very much to
 be able to trace their ancestry to a specific and 'respectable' historic Indian tribe."52
 This combination of misinformation, historical fiction, and desire for "respectabil-
 ity," plus the historical evidence indicating that the Lumbee community is really a
 blending of three clearly identifiable tribes-Hatteras, Saponi, and Cheraw-has
 SoCongressman Charlie Rose introduced a bill in 1975 that would have made Lumbees eligible for
 programs for nonfederally recognized tribes, but would not have made them eligible for BIA programs.
 See Congressional Research Service Report, 1991.
 51Robert K. Thomas, A Report on Research ofLumbee Origins (1980). Author has copy of report.
 52Ibid., p. 62.
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 led to confusion both within and without the Lumbee community as to who exactly
 the Lumbee are.
 WHY HAVE THE LUMBEE NOT SECURED
 COMPLETE FEDERAL RECOGNITION?
 Having described three important grounds for the Lumbees' pursuit of federal
 recognition, we shall now examine the factors that have arrested the Lumbee tribe's
 search for full attainment of federal recognition. For purposes of clarity and
 organization, we have grouped these factors into four categories: (1) policy/
 administrative; (2) fiscal/demographic; (3) administrative/legislative; and (4)
 cultural.
 Policy/Administrative
 Although the Lumbees have sought federal aid and acknowledgment for slightly
 more than 100 years, most ofthe legislative activity has occurred in three distinctive
 historical eras-1880s to 1924; 1950s; and the 1980s. Coincidentally, two of the
 three eras-1880s to 1924 and the 1950s-were periods in which the federal
 government was trying to detribalize Indians by various assimilative measures.
 The third era, Reagan's New Federalism and so-called "government-to-govern-
 ment" period, which Bush supported in a lukewarm way, while not overtly focused
 on tribal assimilation, actually entailed a time of heightened concern because of the
 severe cutbacks in federal expenditures for tribes, and because of several Supreme
 Court decisions that furthered the diminution of individual Indian and tribal
 sovereign rights in the areas of criminal law,53 taxation,54 zoning of property within
 reservations," and religious freedom.56
 In the 1880s to 1924, official federal policy was that of allotment of lands and
 tribal funds, which, it was assumed, would lead to the gradual assimilation and
 Americanization of Indians. In the 1950s, the federal government embarked on its
 last concerted effort to assimilate Indians by legally terminating a number of tribes,
 bands, and rancherias. Moreover, thousands of Indians were encouraged to
 relocate to large cities in the hope that urban life would facilitate their assimilation
 into the American economy and society.
 Of the three eras, it was the 1950s, and in particular the 1956 law known simply
 as the Lumbee Act, which has been the center of contention for nearly four decades.
 After the Lumbees were acknowledged by the state in 1953, they then launched
 their drive for full federal recognition. Three years later, on 7 June 1956, the
 Congress passed An Act Relating to the Lumbee Indians of North Carolina.57 The
 53Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
 54Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163 (1989) and County of Yakima v. Yakima Nation,
 112 S.Ct. 687 (1992).
 "Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima, 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
 56Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) and Employment
 Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
 5770 Stat. 254 (1956).
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 federal law used nearly identical language as the 1953 state law. However, at the
 request of the Department of the Interior, the agency spearheading the national
 termination policy, an exclusionary clause was inserted providing that "nothing in
 this Act shall make such Indians eligible for any services performed by the United
 States for Indians because of their status as Indians, and none of the statutes of the
 United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be
 applicable to the Lumbee Indians.""5
 In hindsight, this clause seems discriminatory, but it was actually appropriate,
 considering the political tenor of the times-termination of federal obligations to
 Indians. The Congress was gearing up to introduce a host of measures that would
 lead to the termination of federal obligations and services to over 11,000 Indians.59
 This is evidenced in the secretary of the interior's testimony against the original
 Lumbee bill in 1956: "We are therefore unable to recommend that the Congress take
 any action which might ultimately result in the imposition of additional obligations
 on the Federal Government or in placing additional persons of Indian blood under
 the jurisdiction of this Department."60
 Ironically, then, the 1956 federal law acknowledged the Lumbees as a distinctive
 tribe, yet simultaneously deprived or precluded them from the same federal services
 generally provided to other acknowledged tribes and the applicability of federal
 Indian statutes tailored for Indian tribes.
 More broadly, from a policy perspective, Deloria has argued that the Lumbee
 effort in the 1950s to secure federal recognition was poorly timed because, as noted
 earlier, they "ran afoul of the termination policy."''61 The termination policy,
 however, was a failure, which has since been repudiated at every level of govern-
 ment. "So," says Deloria, "the 1956 act is an anomaly in Federal Indian legislation.
 Nothing like it had been done prior to that time and nothing like it since then."62 In
 short, Deloria was arguing that if the larger aberration-termination-had been
 disavowed, then termination-inspired provisions, like the 1956 exclusionary clause
 attached to the Lumbee recognition law, should also be deleted. This has already
 occurred in a number of cases where terminated tribes have been restored to full
 federal status as acknowledged sovereign tribes.63 Thus, for the Lumbees, full, not
 partial, federal recognition is deemed necessary to correct this policy problem.
 The Lumbees also petitioned for federal support in the 1930s-the Indian
 Reorganization Act (IRA)64-which was an era of tribal government reform and of
 5870 Stat. 254-255 (1956).
 59See, e.g., Larry W. Burt, Tribalism in Crisis: Federal Indian Policy, 1953-1961 (Albuquerque:
 University of New Mexico Press, 1982) and Donald L. Fixico, Termination and Relocation: Federal
 Indian Policy, 1945-1960 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1986).
 60U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Testimony ofArlindaLocklear, Lumbee
 StaffAttorney, on S. 1036 andH.R. 1426, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, p. 7.
 6'U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672: Federal
 Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe ofNorth Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 25.
 62Ibid.
 63See, e.g., Menominee Restoration Act, 87 Stat. 770 (1973); Siletz Restoration Act, 91 Stat. 1415
 (1977); Paiute Restoration Act, 94 Stat. 317 (1980); Cow Creek Band ofUmqua Restoration Act, 96 Stat.
 1960 (1982); and Klamath Restoration Act, 100 Stat. 849 (1986).
 6448 Stat. 985 (1934).
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 limited tribal self-rule under John Collier's reign as commissioner of Indian affairs.
 However, while these years were certainly more liberal than the prior fifty years,
 they were also restrictive in the sense that it was not until the IRA of 1934 that the
 concept "federal recognition" was expressly declared and utilized as a means to
 determine "which Indian tribes were to be regarded as recognized."''65 This occurred
 when Collier, searching for a measure that would save his bill, said that he would
 be willing to add the phrase "now under Federal jurisdiction" to reduce the number
 of tribes and individual Indians eligible for federal services. That provision, Collier
 added, "would limit the Act to the Indians now under Federal jurisdiction, except
 that other Indians of more than one-half Indian blood would get help."''66 What it
 did was to create a trouble zone in Indian affairs by dichotomizing Indian country.
 In effect, tribes were either "federally recognized" or lumped into a large category
 of so-called "nonrecognized" tribes. This dichotomization was especially prob-
 lematic for smaller tribes-tribes that somehow fell between BIA's cracks, and
 especially for eastern Indian communities which, oftentimes, had never been
 treated with by the federal government. This combination of tribal polarity, plus
 confusion over which tribal name to apply to the Lumbees (were they really
 Cherokees, or were they, as some Smithsonian scholars argued in the 1930s,
 Cheraw or even Siouan?), foreclosed the passage of any bill that would extend
 recognition to the tribe in the 1930s.
 One additional note on the IRA period is warranted, however. While the law
 focused on the restoration of some semblance of tribal government authority,
 Collier also included a provision in IRA to enable unaffiliated (detribalized)
 Indians, as long as they had "one-half or more Indian blood," to receive federal
 services and support. This provision also had rough sailing through the Congress.
 Originally, Collier had wanted to use the one-quarter blood standard. However, the
 powerful chairman of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, Burton K. Wheeler,
 opposed this measure. He said, "if you pass it to where they are quarter-blood
 Indians, you are going to have all kinds of people coming in and claiming they are
 quarter-blood Indian and want to be put upon the Government rolls. ... what we
 are trying to do is get rid of the Indian problem rather than add to it."67 Wheeler
 was successful, and one-half became the standard quantum of blood placed in IRA.
 In 193 5, this portion of Section 19 of IRA was tested by a group ofLumbees from
 Robeson County. BIA initially refused to assist the petitioning Lumbees. But on
 8 April 1935, Felix S. Cohen, then assistant solicitor of the Department of the
 Interior, issued a memorandum to Commissioner Collier's office, detailing the
 rights of what he termed "non-tribal" Indians under IRA. The memo read:
 Clearly, this group [Lumbees, though Cohen referred to them as Siouan Indians of
 North Carolina, because that was the latest name in circulation in Washington] is not
 65Quinn, "Federal Acknowledgement of American Indian Tribes? The Historical Development of a
 Legal Concept," 332.
 66U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2755 andS. 3645, Part 2, 73rd
 Cong., 2nd sess., 1934, p. 266.
 67Ibid., pp. 263-264.
This content downloaded from 141.166.176.168 on Wed, 08 Jan 2020 18:02:45 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 138 Publius/Fall 1993
 a recognized Indian tribe now under "Federal jurisdiction" within the language of
 Section 19 of the ... [IRA].... These Indians like many other Eastern groups, can
 participate in the benefits of the Wheeler/Howard Act only insofar as individual
 members may be one-half or more Indian blood.68
 Collier responded by sending a physical anthropologist, Carl Seltzer, to Robeson
 County. Seltzer's virtually impossible task was to determine definitively by
 researching the Indians' physiological characteristics alone, whether the petition-
 ing tribal individuals met the one-half blood quantum specified in IRA. Seltzer
 "certified" that twenty-two individuals had the necessary "physical traits" to be
 listed as half-blood Indians.
 Despite having met these dubious scientific criteria, BIA continued to deny any
 trust responsibility for these individuals until a federal appeals court ruled in
 Maynor v. Morton (1975),69 that BIA had been negligent. The court said that even
 though Maynor "did not live on a reservation and was not a member of a recognized
 tribe, he remained eligible for benefits of said Act notwithstanding subsequent
 passage of the [1956] Lumbee Act."70
 Fiscal/Demographic
 Testifying in 1988, Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs Ross Swimmer said a
 major reason for the administration's opposition to Lumbee recognition was "the
 sheer [financial] impact, which is estimated to be $30 to $100 million per year."71
 Departmental opposition to Lumbee acknowledgment based on fiscal grounds
 dates as far back as the late-nineteenth century. In 1890, Commissioner Thomas J.
 Morgan of BIA responded to the Lumbees' request for recognition with the
 following statement:
 While I regret exceedingly that the provisions made by the State ofNorth Carolina are
 entirely inadequate, I find it quite impractical to render any assistance at this time.
 ... So long as the immediate wards of the government (some 36,000 Indian children)
 are so insufficiently provided for, I do not see how I can consistently render any
 assistance to the Croatans or any other civilized tribes.72
 The Lumbee tribe, as noted earlier, is the largest nonfederally recognized tribe,
 with some 39,000 enrolled members. It is nearly three times the size of the next
 largest petitioning tribe. Deloria estimates that the Lumbees account for roughly
 60 percent of the indigenous peoples in the United States seeking federal acknowl-
 edgment. The elements of large population and the estimated costs of servicing the
 tribe's membership have been used as evidence by BIA on a number of occasions
 to oppose many of the Lumbees' legislative attempts to secure recognition.
 According to recent statements, "BIA officials often privately acknowledge that,
 68As quoted in Karl A. Funke, "Educational Assistance and Employment Preference: Who Is an
 Indian?," American Indian Law Review 4 (Fall 1976-1977): 26.
 69510 F.2d 1254 (1975).
 17Ibid., p. 1255.
 7'U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 2672: Federal
 Recognition of the Lumbee Indian Tribe ofNorth Carolina, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 9.
 72U.S. Congress, House, H. Rept. 102-215, 24 September 1991, p. 2, note 1.
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 had it not been for the size of the tribe, [they] would have been recognized long
 ago."73
 Lumbee leaders and their congressional advocates have tried to ease the fears of
 other tribes and BIA staff leery of their population base. Several provisions are
 included, for example, in the most recent House bill,74 which give the Committee
 on Appropriations flexibility to address the needs of the Lumbee constituency
 without threatening the budgets of other recognized tribes. Section 3(a), for
 example, requires that any BIA funding for the Lumbee come through a separate
 appropriation, distinctive from outlays for other recognized tribes. In addition,
 federal services would not be provided until the Congress specifically appropriated
 the funds for the tribe. Nevertheless, opposition remains to Lumbee recognition
 from within BIA and among a number of other recognized and nonrecognized
 tribes.
 Administrative/Legislative
 On 2 October 1978, in part as a result of a recommendation by the American
 Indian Policy Review Commission, and after the introduction of legislation, BIA
 established an administrative process through which nonfederally recognized
 tribes could apply for federal acknowledgment. The Bureau of Acknowledgement
 and Research (BAR) was the office assigned the task ofoverseeing the development
 and implementation of what is often referred to as the Federal Acknowledgement
 Process (FAP).
 Although these administratively developed regulations lack specific congres-
 sional authority, the Department of the Interior has general authority delegated by
 the Congress to carry out the federal government's trust obligations to tribes. The
 regulations laid out "mandatory" criteria that petitioning groups had to meet to
 qualify as an Indian tribe. These included: a statement of facts that the petitioning
 tribe has been identified from historical times; evidence that a vast majority of the
 petitioning group inhabit a specific area that is distinct from other populations;
 evidence that the group has continuously exercised governing authority over its
 members; a copy of the group's present governing documents or a statement
 describing the membership criteria; a list of tribal members; a statement that the
 membership of the group is composed principally of persons who do not belong to
 any other tribe; and data that the group was never legally terminated by the federal
 government."
 These criteria, or portions thereof, have been challenged by a number of
 authorities. Some maintain that the criteria force petitioning groups to exhibit "the
 same cultural and political profile as tribes already receiving Federal services.
 [This] is particularly evident in the question of whether a tribe has a constitution,
 [or] whether a tribe has a definite method of establishing its membership."''76 Others
 73Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., Ist sess., 1991, Vol. 137, p. H6894.
 74H.R. 334, 6 January 1993.
 7525 CFR 83.7 (1991).
 76U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Testimony of Vine Deloria, Jr. on S.
 2672, 100th Cong., 2nd sess., 1988, p. 26.
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 have argued that the BAR review process, as carried out by staff historians,
 anthropologists, and genealogists, is sometimes "inconsistent and often injudi-
 cious," and that compounding the situation "is a critical flaw in the petitioning
 process--denials by BAR personnel that there is comparability of results.""
 Despite these concerns, a number of congressional leaders and BIA insist that
 BIA's administrative process, and not the congressional process, is the most
 appropriate forum for determining tribal federal recognition, and that while it is an
 imperfect system, it is the most thorough and consistent route to determine the
 validity of tribal petitions. Ronal Eden, director ofBIA's Office of Tribal Services,
 testifying in 1991, while admitting that the administrative process was imperfect,
 insisted that the bureau had proposed a set of revisions designed to "amend and
 clarify the regulations by eliminating outmoded sections, improving the system for
 considering petitions, providing a new independent appeal procedure and reducing
 the burden of documentation for petitioners that have had previous unambiguous
 federal recognition."7
 A number of recognized tribes, led by the Eastern Band of Cherokees, also
 support this argument.79 Conversely, an equally large number of recognized tribes
 have passed resolutions supporting Lumbee recognition via congressional legisla-
 tion.so
 Cultural
 Cultural factors, or the lack of same, are, alongside the fiscal reasons, the major,
 though infrequently expressed rationale, used by Lumbee opponents in their
 arguments against Lumbees receiving federal recognition. Lumbee detractors,
 whether tribal, non-Indian, or governmental, have at various times argued that the
 Lumbees "lack" certain "cultural" features which other recognized tribes are said
 to possess. Thomas noted this in his 1980 study and said that many local whites and
 some other tribes express the opinion that Lumbees are not "real" Indians. In other
 words, they are perceived as not being a "pure genetic race, they do not have a
 distinctive aboriginal language, and they lack a 'distinct tribal religion'."81
 These racially based attitudes are further complicated by the fact that Lumbees
 "present themselves as members of different tribes [i.e., the six other Indian groups
 inhabiting Robeson County, each claiming to be independent and autonomous]
 which causes some confusion on the part of many Indians of other tribes."82 In
 77William A. Starna, "Public Ethnohistory and Native American Communities: History or
 Administrative Genocide?," Radical History Review 53 (Spring 1992): 126-139.
 78U.S. Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Indian Affairs, Hearings on S. 1315: To Transfer
 Administrative Consideration of Applications for Federal Recognition of an Indian Tribe to an
 Independent Commission, 102nd Cong., 1st sess., 1991, p. 73.
 "For example, the Colorado River Indians, San Carlos Apaches, Ak-Chin, Tohono O'Odham,
 Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, Nez Perce, White Earth Band of Chippewa, Mississippi Band of
 Choctaws, and the Blackfeet Tribe have each argued that the Lumbees should continue through the
 administrative process.
 80These include the Poarch Band of Creeks, Tlingit and Haida of Alaska, Ft. McDowell Indians,
 Mashantuckett Pequot, Seminole Tribe, Tunica Biloxi, Penobscot, Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians,
 Santee Sioux, Duckwater Shoshone, Oneida Nation, and United Keetowah Band of Cherokees, among
 others.
 '8Thomas, A Report on Research ofLumbee Origins, p. 63.
 82Ibid.
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 addition, because the Lumbees did not sign treaties and have never inhabited a
 reservation, this is sometimes interpreted by certain persons and groups as further
 proof that the Lumbees may not be a legitimate tribe.
 As recently as September 1991, Representative Rhodes, an opponent of the
 Lumbee recognition bill, argued that "questions about the validity of Lumbees'
 tribal identity and whether they are in fact a legitimate tribe are very much open to
 debate." To say that "no one disputes whether they are a tribe is not an accurate
 statement.""8 Furthermore, in 1992, Chief Philip Martin of the Mississippi
 Choctaws, a group opposed to Lumbee recognition, submitted a report to Senator
 Daniel Inouye (D-HI), co-chair of the Committee on Indian Affairs, written by a
 tribal employee, Kenneth Carleton, which posited that the Lumbees were merely
 a "tri-racial isolate," with the emphasis being on their alleged African ancestry.
 Martin's report was immediately challenged by a variety of nationally known
 historians and other social scientists who have researched the Lumbee tribe for
 many years. In addition, many resolutions from various tribes and one from the
 National Congress of American Indians were sent in support of the Lumbee tribe.
 CONCLUSION
 A termination point to the Lumbee "Trail of Many Years" is not yet in sight. The
 overwhelming preponderance of evidence suggests that the Lumbee tribe meets
 both the ethnological and legal-political criteria that the federal government utilizes
 to determine the Indian groups to which the United States has obligations.
 Yet, the Lumbee tribe is unique in a multitude of senses: from their distinctive
 genetic background, to their location in a county almost evenly divided between
 African Americans, Euro-Americans, and indigenous Americans, and to the
 relative absence of legally and anthropologically recognized aboriginal cultural
 characteristics (e.g., aboriginal language and traditional ceremonies). Although
 their culture "is very interesting, and much more distinctive and 'Indian' than one
 would think,"84 they are a people still struggling to establish more amicable political
 relations with other tribes, the United States, and among themselves.
 Many external issues are equally problematic. The first and largest question
 involves the meaning of tribes being formally admitted into the intergovernmental
 matrix in a direct government-to-government relationship with the United States.
 From a theoretical and political perspective, recognized tribes, despite their
 acknowledged sovereign status, find themselves in a legal/political quagmire. On
 one hand, federal recognition is an explicit affirmation of the political sovereignty
 of tribes; on the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has held in a number of cases
 that because tribal rights are not constitutionally delineated, the political branches
 may exercise virtually absolute power over tribal treaty, property, and sovereign
 rights. In short, recognized tribes are, in a real sense, in a subordinate, dependent
 relationship to the United States, existing at the "sufferance of Congress."85 They
 83Congressional Record, 102nd Cong., Ist sess., 1991, Vol. 137, p. H6890.
 84Thomas, A Report on Research ofLumbee Origins, p. 62.
 "United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
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 do not even share in the "political safeguards" of federalism said to be enjoyed by
 the states.86 Yet, once a tribe is formally acknowledged by the United States, in some
 basic governmental senses, its status is elevated above that ofthe surrounding states.
 As one federal court stated: "Indian tribes are not states. They have a status higher
 than that of states.""'
 However, federal acknowledgment of tribal sovereignty is further complicated
 because of the secretary of the interior's recent dichotomization of tribes as either
 "historic" entities with a full compliment of governmental powers, or "created"
 entities, like the Pascua Yaqui, with limited governing capabilities.
 Finally, what effect would Lumbee acknowledgment have on their long-standing
 relationship with the State of North Carolina and its counties and municipalities?
 The language of the most recent Lumbee federal bill explicitly authorizes the state
 to maintain civil and criminal jurisdiction over any lands belonging to the tribe.
 However, it also provides that the secretary of the interior could accept any transfer
 by the state of any portion of that jurisdiction in the future, pursuant to a Lumbee-
 state agreement, though such a transfer would not become effective until two years
 after the effective date ofthe agreement. It says nothing, however, about such issues
 as education, taxation, or Indian gaming. These are areas that have led to bitter
 jurisdictional conflicts between tribes and states.
 Each tribe's relationship with the federal and state governments is distinctive,
 and the Lumbee situation is particularly unique from a political-historical-cultural
 perspective. It is safe to say that the Lumbees' evolving relationship with the State
 of North Carolina and their budding relationship with the federal government will
 remain fluid. The passage of a federal law explicitly acknowledging the tribe, if it
 ever occurs, will have an unpredictable impact on intra-tribal, inter-tribal, and
 intergovernmental relations.
 8"Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
 87Native American Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131, 134 (1959).
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